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Many pension insurance contracts as well as life annuity contracts contain minimum guarantees
either in the form of a minimum guaranteed rate of return, minimum guaranteed monetary payments,
or both. It is well-known from the ¯nancial literature on derivative instruments that the value of
such guarantees may be relatively high (in fair value terms) and that the value of these instruments
increases as further optionalities, like exercise timing °exibility, are introduced. Moreover, given
the considerable long maturity of the above mentioned class of insurance contracts, the fair values
of these claims are typically very sensitive with respect to unexpected parametric changes in the
stochastic dynamics characterizing the inter-temporal evolution of the underlying asset value. Thus,
it is naturally of importance to study how embedded potentially costly rights of the issuer to
terminate the contract prior expiry (i.e. cancelation rights) a®ect the value and exercise strategy of
contingent contracts containing minimum guarantees. Especially, delineating those circumstances
under which the issuer ¯nds optimal to exercise a costly cancelation option is important since it
provides valuable information on the maximal amount the issuer is prepared to pay from the right
to terminate a contract prior expiry.
In light of our previous arguments our objective in this study is to consider by following the
pioneering study by Kifer (2000) and the subsequent analysis by Kyprianou (2004) the valuation
of a perpetual ±-penalty minimum guaranteed payment option in the case where the value of the
underlying dividend paying asset follows a linear and time homogenous di®usion. The considered
game option constitutes a ±-penalized version of the minimum guaranteed payment option originally
analyzed in Guo and Shepp (2001). This option guarantees to the holder that whenever the option
is exercised, the holder receives the maximum of the current asset value and a pre-determined
guarantee. The ±-penalized version of this contingent contract has the extra feature that it o®ers
to the issuer an embedded costly cancelation option which permits the issuer to exercise the option
as well but only at a predetermined cost which has to be added into the exercise payo® of the
holder. Consequently, even though the value of this contingent contract naturally dominates the
exercise payo® of the perpetual minimum guaranteed payment option its value is always majorized
by the sum of this payo® and the predetermined penalty. Moreover, since the issuer has the option
to terminate the contract early as well, the valuation of this contract can be interpreted as the
1valuation of the saddle point strategy and value of an associated Dynkin game (for mathematical
references, see Friedman (1973a,b), Bensoussan and Friedman (1974, 1977), Karatzas and Wang
(2001), Fukushima and Taksar (2002), Touzi and Vieille (2002), Boetius (2005), EkstrÄ om (2006),
EkstrÄ om and Villeneuve (2006), and Alvarez (2006)). Instead of relying on variational inequalities,
we characterize the value as well as the optimal exercise policy explicitly by focusing on saddle
point strategies which can be characterized as ¯rst exit times from open intervals belonging into
the state space of the underlying di®usion. Having derived this representation, we investigate how
the value can be found by choosing the boundaries so that the resulting value is extremal. In this
way, the resulting pair of boundaries can be derived from a pair of ordinary ¯rst order conditions.
We state a set of typically satis¯ed conditions under which a unique pair exists and characterize
the value in terms of these boundaries. As intuitively is clear, two optimal regimes arise depending
on the precise magnitude of the penalty (and, therefore, the cost of protection). If the penalty
exceeds a volatility dependent critical size, then it is always suboptimal to the issuer to exercise the
opportunity to terminate the contract early and, consequently, in that case both the value as well
as the optimal exercise strategy coincide with their corresponding counterparts in the non-strategic
setting. However, if the penalty is below the above mentioned critical penalty, then it becomes
optimal to the issuer to exercise the cancelation right as soon as the underlying asset value coincides
with the minimum guarantee. Given that the critical penalty is a monotonically increasing function
of volatility, an interesting implication of our ¯ndings is that an unexpected increase in volatility
may result into a switch from the regime where the value coincides with the nonstrategic one to the
corner solution case where also the issuer ¯nds optimal to exercise early.
The contents of this study are as follows. In section two we consider the considered class of
¯nancial derivative instruments and the underlying value of the dividend paying asset. In section
three the value and optimal exercise strategy is characterized in the typical case where the underlying
dynamics are characterized by a geometric Brownian motion. In section four we then extend our
analysis to the general setting and state a set of general conditions under which the conclusions
on the sensitivity of the optimal policy with respect to volatility changes obtained in the geometric
Brownian motion case are qualitatively robust and illustrate our general results explicitly in the
mean reverting case. Finally, section ¯ve concludes our study.
22 The ±-penalty Minimum Guaranteed Payment Option
The main objective of this study is to characterize the value and equilibrium exercise strategy of a
class of derivative instruments containing strategic elements. In order to accomplish this task we
¯rst have to characterize the state variable modeling the underlying asset value. As usually, we
assume that it constitutes a linear, time homogeneous, and regular di®usion process de¯ned on the
complete ¯ltered probability space (­;P;fFtgt¸0;F) and that it evolves on R+ according to the
dynamics described by the It^ o-stochastic di®erential equation
dXt = ¹(Xt)dt + µ¾(Xt)dWt; X0 = x; (1)
where Wt denotes standard Brownian motion, µ 2 R+ is an exogenously given constant multiplier
(introduced in order to consider the impact of increased volatility on the optimal policy and its
value), and both the drift coe±cient ¹ : R+ 7! R and the di®usion coe±cient ¾ : R+ 7! R+ are
assumed to be su±ciently smooth for guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of a (weak) solution
for the stochastic di®erential equation (1) (at least continuous, cf. Borodin and Salminen (1996),
pp. 46{47). In order to avoid interior singularities, we also assume that the di®usion coe±cient









denotes the di®erential operator associated to the underlying di®usion Xt. It is well-known that
given the assumptions of our study, there are two linearly independent fundamental solutions Ãµ(x)
and 'µ(x) (constituting the minimal r-harmonic mappings for the di®usion X) satisfying a set of
appropriate boundary conditions based on the boundary behavior of the process X and spanning the
set of solutions of the ordinary di®erential equation (Aµu)(x) = ru(x) (cf. Borodin and Salminen
2002, pp. 18 - 19). Moreover, Ã0
µ(x)'µ(x) ¡ '0
µ(x)Ãµ(x) = BµS0
µ(x); where Bµ > 0 denotes the









denotes the density of the scale function of X.
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze the properties of the value and optimal exercise policy
of the ±-penalty minimum guaranteed payment option (the ±-penalty MGP-option). The value of





max(X¿;p)1f¿·°g + (max(X¿;p) + ±)1f¿>°g
¢i
; (2)
where p > 0 denotes the minimum guaranteed payment and ± > 0 denotes the penalty that the issuer
has to pay to the holder in case the issuer exercises ¯rst (i.e. in case the issuer chooses to exercise the
costly cancelation right before the holder exercises the option). As usually, the associated lower and
upper values are de¯ned as V µ(x) = sup¿ inf° ¦x(¿;°) and V µ(x) = inf° sup¿ ¦x(¿;°), respectively.
It is clear that
max(x;p) · V µ(x) · V µ(x) · max(x;p) + ±:
Hence, if we also have V µ(x) ¸ V µ(x), then the considered stochastic optimal stopping game has a
value and this value is denoted as Vµ(x) = V µ(x) = V µ(x).
Finally, a pair of stopping times (¿0;°0) is said to constitute a saddle point of the considered
Dynkin game whenever the condition ¦x(¿;°0) · ¦x(¿0;°0) · ¦x(¿0;°) is satis¯ed for all stopping
times ¿;°. In light of this inequality, it is clear that the existence of a saddle point guarantees the
existence of the value for the considered game. Moreover, if the considered Dynkin game has the
value Vµ(x), then the pair of stopping times
¿¤ = infft ¸ 0 : Vµ(Xt) · max(x;p)g (3)
and
°¤ = infft ¸ 0 : Vµ(Xt) ¸ max(x;p) + ±g (4)
constitute a saddle point for the game.
As we will later establish, the value of the ±-penalty MGP-option is closely related to the value








which was originally considered in Guo and Shepp (2001) in the case the underlying dynamics are
characterized by geometric Brownian motion.
43 The Geometric Brownian Motion Case
We begin the analysis of our study by considering the ±-penalty MGP-option in the case where the
underlying di®usion evolves according to a standard geometric Brownian motion characterized by
the in¯nitesimal coe±cients ¹(x) = ¹x and ¾(x) = µx, where ¹;µ 2 R+ are known constants. It
is well-known that in this case the fundamental solutions of the ordinary second order di®erential


































denote the the roots of the characteristic equation µ2a(a ¡ 1) + 2¹ = 2r.






where ¿(a;b) = infft ¸ 0 : Xt 62 (a;b)g denotes the ¯rst exit time from the open interval (a;b). It
is well-known from the literature on linear di®usions that this value satis¯es for all x 2 (a;b) the
ordinary di®erential equation (AµFa;b)(x) = rFa;b(x) subject to the boundary conditions Fa;b(a) =
max(a;p) and Fa;b(b) = max(b;p). Hence, we observe that the expected present value Fa;b(x) can
be re-expressed explicitly as
Fa;b(x) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
max(x;p) x ¸ b
max(a;p)
^ 'b(x)
^ 'b(a) + max(b;p)
^ Ãa(x)
^ Ãa(b) x 2 (a;b)
max(x;p) x · a;
(7)
where in the present case the functions ^ Ãa(x) and ^ 'b(x) are de¯ned as
^ Ãa(x) = x´µ ¡ a´µ¡ºµxºµ (8)
and
^ 'b(x) = xºµ ¡ bºµ¡´µx´µ: (9)








In light of this inequality, we now investigate under which conditions the boundaries a and b can
be chosen so that the value Fa;b(x) coincides with the value of the optimal stopping problem (10).
These conditions are now summarized in the following.






















p > p (12)
Proof. Since Jµ(x) ¸ Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x) it is su±cient to demonstrate that the reverse inequality holds. To
this end, we ¯rst notice that the proposed value Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x) is continuously di®erentiable on R+, twice
continuously di®erentiable on R+nfx¤
µ;y¤









µ§)j < 1. Moreover, since the value Fx¤
µ;y¤






































we ¯nd that Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x) is strictly convex on (x¤
µ;y¤












µ) for all x 2 (x¤
µ;y¤
µ). In light of these observations we ¯nd that the mapping
¢(x) = Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x)¡max(x;p) satis¯es the conditions ¢(x¤
µ) = ¢(y¤
µ) = 0, and ¢0(x¤
µ) = ¢0(y¤
µ) = 0.




µ) then shows that









> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
¡(r ¡ ¹)x x > y¤
µ
0 x 2 (x¤
µ;y¤
µ)
¡rp x < x¤
µ
we observe that Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x) satis¯es the su±cient variational inequalities guaranteeing that it consti-
tutes a majorant of the value Jµ(x) and, therefore, that Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x) ¸ Jµ(x). This completes the proof
of our lemma.
6Lemma 3.1 characterize explicitly the value and exercise boundaries of the MGP-option in
the present case. As intuitively is clear the optimal exercise policy is such that the holder takes
the minimum guarantee at the lower boundary and the underlying stock at the upper boundary.
Between these two boundaries the value of the option dominates the exercise payo® and waiting is
optimal. The comparative static properties of the value and optimal policy are now summarized in
our next lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Assume that r > ¹. Then increased volatility increases the value of the optimal
timing policy and expands the continuation region by increasing y¤
µ and decreasing x¤
µ. That is,
@Jµ(x)=@µ > 0, @y¤
µ=@µ > 0, and @x¤
µ=@µ < 0.
Proof. Denote the value of the MGP-option de¯ned with respect to the less volatile dynamics









As was established in the proof of Lemma 3.1 the value Jµ(x) of the MGP-option is continuously
di®erentiable on R+, twice continuously di®erentiable on R+nfx¤
µ;y¤
µg, convex on R+, and satis¯es
the inequality Jµ(x) ¸ max(x;p) for all x 2 R+. Moreover, since
(A~ µJµ)(x) ¡ rJµ(x) ·
1
2
(~ µ2 ¡ µ2)x2J00
µ (x) · 0 for all x 2 R+nfx¤
µ;y¤
µg
by the convexity of the value Jµ(x) we notice that Jµ(x) constitutes a r-excessive majorant of the
payo® max(x;p) for the less volatile di®usion as well. Since J~ µ(x) constitutes the least of these
majorants, we ¯nd that Jµ(x) ¸ J~ µ(x).
Denote the continuation regions associated to the stopping problems as Cµ = fx 2 R+ : Jµ(x) >
max(x;p)g and C~ µ = fx 2 R+ : J~ µ(x) > max(x;p)g. If x 2 C~ µ then Jµ(x) ¸ J~ µ(x) > max(x;p)
implying that x 2 Cµ as well. Hence, C~ µ µ Cµ and the alleged result follows.
Lemma 3.2 characterizes the sensitivity of the value and the optimal boundaries with respect
to changes in the volatility of the underlying dividend paying stock. As usually, our results indicate
that higher volatility postpones rational exercise by expanding the continuation region. Essentially,
the reason for this observation is that increased volatility raises the value of waiting while leaving
7the exercise payo® unchanged. The optimal boundaries are explicitly illustrated as functions of the
volatility coe±cient µ in Figure 1 under the numerical assumptions that r = 0:035;¹ = 0:02; and
p = 1.















Figure 1: The Exercise Boundaries as Functions of Volatility
Our main conclusion on the value of the ±-penalty MGP-option is now summarized in the
following.
Theorem 3.3. Assume that r > ¹ and de¯ne the mapping ¢µ : R+ 7! R+ as ¢µ = Jµ(p) ¡ p.
(A) If ± ¸ ¢µ then Vµ(x) = Jµ(x) = Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x).
(B) If ± < ¢µ then
Vµ(x) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
x x 2 [¹ yµ;1)
(p + ±)
^ '¹ yµ(x)
^ '¹ yµ(p) + ¹ yµ
^ Ãp(x)
^ Ãp(¹ yµ) x 2 (p; ¹ yµ)
p + ± x = p
p
^ 'p(x)
^ 'p(¹ xµ) + (p + ±)
^ Ã¹ xµ(x)
^ Ã¹ xµ(p) x 2 (¹ xµ;p)
p x 2 (0; ¹ xµ];
(13)
where the functions ^ 'b(x) and ^ Ãa(x) are de¯ned as in (9) and (8), respectively, and the optimal









































µ(x) x < p
1 ¡ J0
µ(x) x > p
and, therefore, that p = argminfDµ(x)g. Hence, our assumption imply that Dµ(x) > Dµ(p) =
p + ± ¡ Jµ(p) ¸ 0 for all x 2 R+. Consequently, max(x;p) · Jµ(x) · max(x;p) + ± for all x 2 R+.
Moreover, since Jµ(x) is r-excessive for the underlying di®usion Xt, we ¯nd that the proposed
value function satis¯es the su±cient conditions (AµVµ)(x) · rVµ(x) on R+ where the proposed
value is smaller than max(x;p) + ± and (AµVµ)(x) = rVµ(x) on the set (x¤
µ;y¤
µ) where the proposed
value is greater than max(x;p). Since this value is attainable by the admissible stopping policy
¿(x¤
µ;y¤
µ) = infft ¸ 0 : Xt 62 (x¤
µ;y¤
µ)g, we ¯nd that Vµ(x) = Jµ(x) = Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x).
(B) Assume that ± < ¢µ. It is clear from part (A) that in that case there is a nonempty open
interval where Jµ(x) > max(x;p)+± and, therefore, that Jµ(x) does not constitute the value of the
saddle point strategy. Given this observation, we now propose that the value function is r-harmonic
on a set (¹ xµ;p) [ (p; ¹ yµ), satis¯es the smooth ¯t conditions at the thresholds ¹ xµ; ¹ yµ, and coincides
with p + ± at p. More precisely, we propose that
(AµVµ)(x) = rVµ(x);Vµ(¹ xµ) = p;V 0
µ(¹ xµ) = 0
for all x 2 (¹ xµ;p) and that
(AµVµ)(x) = rVµ(x);Vµ(¹ yµ) = ¹ yµ;V 0
µ(¹ yµ) = 1
































for all x 2 (p; ¹ yµ). Invoking continuity at the boundary p then yields the conditions (14) and (15).





























Thus, equation K1(x) = 0 has a unique root ¹ xµ 2 (0;p). Establishing that the function













has a unique root ¹ yµ 2 (p;1) is completely analogous.
In light of these observations, it is now clear that the proposed value function is non-decreasing
and continuous on R+, continuously di®erentiable on R+nfpg, twice continuously di®erentiable on
R+nf¹ xµ;p; ¹ yµg, r-harmonic on (¹ xµ;p)[(p; ¹ yµ), and r-superharmonic on (0; ¹ xµ)[(¹ yµ;1). Moreover,
since Vµ(x) = p on (0; ¹ xµ) and Vµ(x) = x on (¹ yµ;1), we ¯nd that the proposed value function is
convex on R+. Applying now the proof of part (ii) of Theorem 2 in Kyprianou (2004) and noticing
that the proposed value is attained by the admissible (Markov time) stopping policy ¿¤ = infft ¸
0 : Xt 62 (¹ xµ;p) [ (p; ¹ yµ)g then completes the proof of the alleged result.
Theorem 3.3 characterizes the value and optimal exercise policy of the ±-penalty MGP-option.
According to Theorem 3.3 there is a critical penalty above which the issuer is no longer prepared to
exercise the embedded costly cancelation option and the value coincides with the value of the MGP-
option in the nonstrategic setting. However, below the critical penalty the issuer uses the cancelation
option and terminates the contract as soon as the underlying value coincides with the minimum
guarantee. As in the non-strategic setting, the exercise policy of the holder is characterized by two
boundaries. The value functions in the two cases arising in Theorem 3.3 are explicitly illustrated
in Figure 2 under the assumptions that r = 0:035;¹ = 0:02;p = 1; and ¾ = 0:2 (implying that
¢0:2 = 0:092).




















Figure 2: The Value Functions (uniform curves) and Exercise Payo®s (dashed curves)
An interesting implication of our observations characterizing the one-to-one nature of the critical
penalty ¢µ as a function of volatility is now summarized in the following.
Corollary 3.4. Assume that r > ¹. Then, ¢µ is a monotonically increasing function of volatility,
limµ#0 ¢µ = 0, and limµ!1 ¢µ = 1. Hence, for any given ¯xed penalty ± 2 R+ there is a unique
volatility coe±cient µ = ¢¡1
± for which the optimal equilibrium strategy and its value can then be
described as in part (A) of Theorem 3.3 as long as µ · ¢¡1
± and as in part (B) of Theorem 3.3
whenever µ > ¢¡1
± .
Proof. It is clear that under our assumptions we have ´µ > 1, ºµ < 0, limµ!1 ºµ = 0, and
limµ!1 ´µ = 1. These observations imply that x¤
µ # 0 and y¤
µ " 1 as µ ! 1. Hence, we also
observe that Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x) " 1 as µ ! 1. The alleged result is now a direct implication of Theorem
3.3.
Corollary 3.4 demonstrates that in the present case the the critical penalty ¢µ constitutes
a bijection as a function of volatility. Thus, for any predetermined penalty ± there is a unique
volatility coe±cient µ = ¢¡1
± for which the embedded cancelation option becomes valuable for the
issuer as soon as volatility exceeds this value. This ¯nding is interesting since it proves that increased
volatility does not only increase the value of the optimal exercise policy for the holder, it increases
the value of the embedded cancelation option as well. The critical penalty is illustrated explicitly
in Figure 3 under the assumptions that r = 0:035;¹ = 0:03; and p = 1.








Figure 3: The Critical Penalty
4 The General Case
Having considered the valuation of the ±-penalty MGP-option in the standard case where the un-
derlying value dynamics is characterized as a standard geometric Brownian motion, we now proceed
in our analysis and consider the value of this contract in a more general setting as well. Along
the lines of our previous observations, we ¯rst consider the underlying nonstrategic MGP-option
and its value, and then present our main conclusions on the ±-penalty MGP-option in terms of this
contingent contract. In accordance with our previous analysis, the chosen approach is based on the
determination of the functional (6). In the present case, it can be expressed explicitly as in (7)
subject to the obvious modi¯cation of the functionals ^ Ãa(x) and ^ 'b(x) which in the present case
read as








Before analyzing the considered ±-penalty MGP-option, we ¯rst present two auxiliary results extend-
ing previous ¯ndings to the present case. We ¯rst establish that the monotonicity of the appreciation
rate and the boundary behavior of the underlying di®usion are su±cient conditions for the convexity
of the minimal r-excessive mappings Ãµ(x) and 'µ(x). This task is accomplished in the following.
12Lemma 4.1. Assume that the net appreciation rate ®(x) = ¹(x) ¡ rx is non-increasing and that
the boundaries 0 and 1 are natural for Xt. Then, the minimal r-harmonic mappings Ãµ(x) and










Ãµ(a) x · a
'µ(x)
'µ(a) x ¸ a
(20)
for any 0 < a < 1 and x 2 R+.
Proof. Consider ¯rst the increasing function Ãµ(x). It is clear that since Ãµ(x) satis¯es the ordinary




















































































































Letting a # 0 and invoking the boundary condition Ã0
µ(a)=S0
µ(a) # 0 as a # 0 then implies that
Ã00
µ(x) > 0 for all x 2 R+. Hence, Ãµ(x) is strictly convex on R+. Establishing the strict convexity of
'µ(x) is entirely analogous. The positivity of the sign of the relationship between increased volatility
and the value of the functional (20) follows from Corollary 3 in Alvarez (2003).
13Lemma 4.1 states a set of conditions under which the minimal r-harmonic mappings for the
underlying di®usion are strictly convex and, consequently, under which increased volatility unam-
biguously increases the values of the contingent contracts guaranteeing to the holder one dollar at
the ¯rst time the underlying hits a predetermined boundary y. It is worth noticing that Lemma
4.1 extends part of the results of Alvarez (2003) since no integrability conditions are needed for the
veri¯cation of convexity; only the local behavior of the in¯nitesimal characteristics count when the
boundaries of the state space are natural for the underlying dynamics characterizing the value of the
dividend paying stock. Our main ¯nding on the MGP-option in the absence of strategic interaction
is now summarized in the following.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that the net appreciation rate ®(x) = ¹(x)¡rx is non-increasing and non-
positive and that 0 and 1 are natural boundaries for the underlying di®usion Xt. Then, the value





> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :

















µ) x 2 (x¤
µ;y¤
µ)
p; x 2 (0;x¤
µ);
(25)











































Proof. We ¯rst establish that if a pair satisfying the optimality conditions exist, then the resulting
candidate value constitutes a r-excessive majorant of the underlying exercise payo®. To this end, we
¯rst notice that the proposed value function is continuously di®erentiable on R+, twice continuously
di®erentiable on R+nfx¤
µ;y¤
µg, r-harmonic on (x¤
µ;y¤
µ), r-superharmonic on (0;x¤
µ) [ (y¤
µ;1), and








µ§)j < 1. Hence, Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x) is r-excessive
for the underlying di®usion Xt. We now prove that it dominates the underlying exercise payo® as
well. Since Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x) = max(x;p) on (0;x¤
µ] [ [y¤






14on the continuation set (x¤
µ;y¤
µ). It is clear that we have H1(x¤
µ) = H1(y¤

























































































Applying (22) and (24) then show that H1(x) is increasing on (x¤
µ;p) and decreasing on (p;y¤
µ). Con-
sequently, we ¯nd that Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x) > max(x;p) for all (x¤
µ;y¤
µ). Hence, the proposed value constitutes
a r-excessive majorant of the payo® max(x;p) for the underlying di®usion Xt. Since the value Jµ(x)
is the least of these majorants, we observe that Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x) ¸ Jµ(x). However, since the proposed





µ(x) · Jµ(x) as well.
It remains to establish that the ordinary ¯rst order conditions (26) and (27) have a unique root.































It is clear that l1(y;y) < 0 and limx#0 l1(x;y) = +1 (since 0 is natural for Xt) for any y 2 (p;1).
Since (@l1=@x)(x;y) = ¡rp'µ(x)m0
µ(x) < 0 we ¯nd that equation l1(x;y) = 0 has a unique root ~ xy












Analogously, we ¯nd that l2(x;x) < 0 for any x 2 (0;p). Applying now equation (23) and invoking














































where » 2 (x;y). Letting y ! 1 then shows that limy!1 l2(x;y) = +1 (since 1 is natural for
Xt). Since (@l2=@y)(x;y) = ¡®(y)Ãµ(y)m0
µ(y) > 0 we ¯nd that equation l2(x;y) = 0 has a unique






























demonstrating that if a pair x¤
µ < y¤
µ satisfying the ¯rst order conditions (26) and (27) exists, it is
unique. In order to demonstrate that such a pair indeed exists, we now show that ~ yx and ~ xy have
an interception point (x¤
µ;y¤
µ) 2 (0;p)£(p;1). Consider ¯rst the roots of the equations l1(p;y) = 0





































2) · 0 and, therefore, that y¤
1 ¸ y¤
2, where y¤
1 denotes the root of l1(p;y) = 0.



















2 the root of l2(x¤



















2;p) ¸ 0 and, therefore, that x¤
1 ¸ x¤
2, where x¤
1 denotes the root of l1(x;p) = 0.
Combining these inequalities then demonstrate that ~ xy and ~ yx have a unique interception on the
set 2 (0;p) £ (p;1) which completes the proof of our theorem.
Theorem 4.2 extends the results of Lemma 3.1 to a general di®usion setting. Along the lines
of the Lemma 3.1 we again observe that the optimal policy is characterized by two boundaries at
which the value of an exercise policy which is characterized as a ¯rst exit time from an open interval
is maximized. The comparative static properties of the value and the optimal exercise strategy are
now summarized in the following.
Theorem 4.3. Assume that the net appreciation rate ®(x) = ¹(x)¡rx is non-increasing and non-
positive and that 0 and 1 are natural boundaries for the underlying di®usion Xt. Then, the value
function Jµ(x) is convex on R+ and strictly convex on (x¤
µ;y¤
µ). Moreover, higher volatility increases
the value and expands the continuation region where exercising the option is suboptimal. That is,
@Jµ(x)=@µ > 0, @x¤
µ=@µ < 0, and @y¤
µ=@µ > 0.

















Since a positive a±ne combination of two strictly convex functions is strictly convex, we ¯nd that
the alleged convexity of Jµ(x) follows from Lemma 4.1. Establishing now that increased volatility
increases the value and expands the continuation region is analogous with the proof of Lemma
3.2.
Theorem 4.3 extends the ¯ndings of Lemma 3.2 to the general setting. Interestingly, we observe
that the sign of the relationship between higher volatility and the optimal policy is a process speci¯c
property which is mainly based on the behavior of the net appreciation rate of the underlying
dynamics.
Having considered the MGP-option in the general setting we are now in position to proceed into
the analysis of the ±-penalty MGP-option. Our main conclusion on the value of this game option is
now summarized in the following.
17Theorem 4.4. Assume that the net appreciation rate ®(x) = ¹(x) ¡ rx is non-increasing and
non-positive, that 0 and 1 are natural boundaries for the underlying di®usion Xt, and de¯ne the
mapping ¢µ : R+ 7! R+ as ¢µ = Jµ(p) ¡ p.
(A) If ± ¸ ¢µ then Vµ(x) = Jµ(x) = Fx¤
µ;y¤
µ(x).
(B) If ± < ¢µ then
Vµ(x) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
x x 2 [¹ yµ;1)
(p + ±)
^ '¹ yµ(x)
^ '¹ yµ(p) + ¹ yµ
^ Ãp(x)
^ Ãp(¹ yµ) x 2 (p; ¹ yµ)
p + ± x = p
p
^ 'p(x)
^ 'p(¹ xµ) + (p + ±)
^ Ã¹ xµ(x)
^ Ã¹ xµ(p) x 2 (¹ xµ;p)
p x 2 (0; ¹ xµ];
(30)
where the functions ^ Ãa(x) and ^ 'b(x) are de¯ned as in (18) and (19), respectively, and the











Ãµ(p) = (p + ±)B (31)






µ(¹ yµ)¹ yµ ¡ Ãµ(¹ yµ)
S0
µ(¹ yµ)
'µ(p) = (p + ±)B (32)
Proof. (A) It is clear from Theorem 4.2 that the proposed value constitutes the minimal r-excessive
majorant of the payo® max(x;p) for the di®usion Xt. Moreover, as was observed in the proof of
Theorem 3.3 Jµ(x) · p + ± for all x 2 R+ as long as ± ¸ Jµ(p) ¡ p in this case as well.
(B) We ¯rst establish that the ¯rst order conditions (31) and (32) have unique roots. To this end,






















'µ(p) ¡ (p + ±)B:
It is clear that K1(p) = ¡±B < 0, K1(x) " +1 as x # 0 since '0
µ(x)=S0
µ(x) # ¡1 when 0 is a natural
boundary, and K0
1(x) = ¡rpÃµ(p)^ 'p(x)m0
µ(x) < 0 for all x 2 (0;p). Hence, equation K1(x) = 0 has
a unique root ¹ xµ 2 (0;p). Analogously, we observe that K2(p) = ¡B± < 0 and
K0
2(x) = ¡(¹(x) ¡ rx)'µ(p) ^ Ãp(x)m0
µ(x) > 0




(rt ¡ ¹(t))'µ(p) ^ Ãp(t)m0















where » 2 (p;x). Letting x " 1 and applying the result that Ã0
µ(x)=S0
µ(x) " 1 and '0
µ(x)=S0
µ(x) " 0
as x " 1 demonstrates that K2(x) " 1 as x " 1. Thus, equation K2(x) = 0 has a unique root on
(p;1). In light of these ¯ndings, we observe as in Theorem 3.3 that the proposed value function
is continuous on R+, continuously di®erentiable on R+nfpg, twice continuously di®erentiable on
R+nf¹ xµ;p; ¹ yµg, r-harmonic on (¹ xµ;p)[(p; ¹ yµ), and r-superharmonic on (0; ¹ xµ)[(¹ yµ;1). Moreover,
since Vµ(x) = p on (0; ¹ xµ) and Vµ(x) = x on (¹ yµ;1), we again observe that the proposed value
function is convex on R+. Applying now the proof of part (ii) of Theorem 2 in Kyprianou (2004)
and noticing that the proposed value is attained by the admissible stopping policy ¿¤ = infft ¸ 0 :
Xt 62 (¹ xµ;p) [ (p; ¹ yµ)g then completes the proof of our theorem.
In light of the ¯ndings of our Theorem 4.3 it is clear that if the conditions of Theorem 4.4
are satis¯ed then the critical penalty ¢µ is monotonically increasing as a function of volatility.
Unfortunately, it is di±cult to characterize the limits limµ#0 ¢µ and limµ!1 ¢µ in the general setting.
Numerical computations in explicitly parameterized models seem to indicate that the conclusions
of Corollary 3.4 are typically satis¯ed in a general setting as well. Therefore, we conjecture that for
any given ¯xed penalty ± 2 R+ there is a unique volatility coe±cient µ = ¢¡1
± in a general setting
as well.
4.1 Explicit Illustration
In order to illustrate our general ¯ndings explicitly, assume now that the underlying dynamics are
characterized by the logistic stochastic di®erential equation
dXt = ¹Xt(1 ¡ °Xt)dt + µXtdWt; X0 = x:
In this case the minimal r-harmonic mappings (i.e. the fundamental solutions) read as
Ãµ(x) = x´µM(´µ;1 + ´µ ¡ ºµ;2¹°x=µ2)
'µ(x) = xºµM(ºµ;1 ¡ ´µ + ºµ;2¹°x=µ2);
19µ 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
x¤
µ 1.9602 1.8488 1.6865 1.4984 1.3064 1.1254 0.9636 0.8236
y¤
µ 2.055 2.2216 2.5028 2.9019 3.419 4.0506 4.7891 5.6238
¢µ 0.0115 0.045 0.0976 0.1652 0.2435 0.328 0.4151 0.5021
¢µ=p 0.0058 0.0225 0.0488 0.0826 0.1217 0.164 0.2076 0.2511
Table 1: The Optimal Boundaries and the Critical Penalty
where ´µ > 0 and ºµ < 0 are de¯ned as in Section 3 and M denotes the Kummer con°uent
hypergeometric function. If r > ¹, then these solutions are strictly convex and the conditions of
our Theorem 4.4 are satis¯ed and, therefore, the MGP-option has a well-de¯ned value Jµ(x) as well
as an exercise strategy which is characterized by the stopping boundaries x¤
µ and y¤
µ. The optimal
exercise boundaries as well as the critical penalty are numerically illustrated for various volatilities
in Table 1 under the numeric assumptions that r = 0:04;¹ = 0:03;° = 0:1; and p = 2.
It is worth noticing that in the present example the increasing fundamental solution Ãµ(x) is
locally concave on a neighborhood of the origin as long as r · ¹ and that there is a unique threshold
such that Ãµ(x) is strictly convex for all states above that threshold. Hence, an optimal policy may
exist even when r · ¹. The value of the optimal exercise policy is illustrated in that case in Figure
4 under the numeric assumptions that r = 0:03;¹ = 0:04;° = 0:1;¾ = 0:1; and p = 2. The optimal
boundaries and the critical penalty are, in turn, numerically illustrated for various volatilities in
Table 2 under the numeric assumptions that r = 0:03;¹ = 0:04;° = 0:1; and p = 2. Given the
local positivity of the net appreciation rate on the set (0;(¹ ¡ r)=(¹°)) it is clear that now the
optimal policy is more sensitive with respect to changes in the volatility coe±cient µ. Interestingly,
our results indicate that the ratio between the critical penalty and the minimum guaranteed sum at
low volatilities is low (1.97%). However, as the volatility coe±cient becomes higher the embedded
cancelation option of the issuer becomes more valuable and the ratio between the critical penalty
and the minimum guaranteed sum becomes more signi¯cant (37.52%).
















Figure 4: The Values (uniform curves) and Exercise Payo®s (dashed curves)
µ 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
x¤
µ 1.9054 1.7077 1.4662 1.2294 1.0203 0.8452 0.7027 0.5879
y¤
µ 2.6015 3.0293 3.7028 4.5103 5.4151 6.3932 7.4264 8.501
¢µ 0.0394 0.1157 0.2167 0.3282 0.4414 0.5512 0.6546 0.7505
¢µ=p 0.0197 0.0578 0.1083 0.1641 0.2207 0.2756 0.3273 0.3752
Table 2: The Optimal Boundaries and the Critical Penalty
5 Conclusions
We considered the valuation and optimal exercise policy of a contingent contract guaranteeing the
holder a minimum monetary payment at exercise and a costly right to terminate the contract before
expiry to the issuer in the case where the value of the underlying dividend-paying asset follows a
one dimensional but otherwise general time homogenous di®usion. Along the lines of the pioneering
work by Kifer (2000) and the subsequent study by Kyprianou (2004), the considered contingent
contract was modeled as a ±-penalized version of the minimum guaranteed payment option which
was originally analyzed in Guo and Shepp (2001) in a non-strategic setting based on geometric
Brownian motion. We presented a set of ordinary ¯rst order conditions characterizing the optimal
boundaries and stated a set of typically satis¯ed conditions under which the pair of optimality
conditions admit a unique root. The resulting saddle point strategy and value of the game option
was then explicitly expressed in terms of the exercise boundaries. Interestingly, our results indicate
that the sign of the relationship between increased volatility and the value of the option is positive in
21this case as well and that higher volatility decelerates rational exercise by expanding the continuation
region where waiting is optimal.
There are several directions towards which our analysis could be extended. First, even though
the assumed perpetuity of the contract is acceptable in the cases where the maturities are relatively
long (say 30-40 years) it is not clear whether our ¯ndings and main conclusions would hold in a
¯nite horizon setting. Previous studies of game options and Dynkin games indicate that the optimal
policies are very sensitive with respect to the length of the time horizon and, thus, it may very well
be the case that at least part of our conclusions would no longer hold in the ¯nite horizon case. A
second interesting extension (from the point of view of risk management) of our analysis would be
to add spectrally negative jumps into the underlying dynamics. Such an extension would provide
valuable information on the impact of downside risk on the optimal exercise policies of both the
issuer and the holder. Both of these extensions are outside the scope of the present formulation and
left for future research.
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